Torts -- Rear-End Collision -- Presumption of Fault by Heller, Samuel L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
12-1-1958
Torts -- Rear-End Collision -- Presumption of Fault
Samuel L. Heller
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel L. Heller, Torts -- Rear-End Collision -- Presumption of Fault, 13 U. Miami L. Rev. 236 (1958)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol13/iss2/8
CASES NOTED
TORTS - REAR-END COLLISION -
PRESUMPTION OF FAULT
'he plaintiff's car, while stopped at a traffic light, was struck from
the rear by defendant's automobile; the solc testimony as to the collision
was that of the plaintiff. Held, evidence of a rear-cnd collision created a
presumption of negligence and in the absence of explanation from the
defendant, the trial court properly directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785(Ila. App. 1958).
T he distinction between a presumiption and an inference is generally
made by the courts in terms of its effect upon the evidentiary burdens
which the law imposes on adverse litigants.1 Where the evidence intro-
duccd by a proponent of fact is such that it raises a "presumption" the
party against whom it is raised must meet it by proof of facts inconsistent
with the fact presumed or the facts on which the presumption rests, 2 at
the risk of exposing himself to an adverse peremptory ruling by the court
(non-suit or directed verdict). "An inference," however, "is a mere deduction
from facts which reason dictates,'' not one which the law compels. In
such a case where the proponent introduces evidence sufficient to permit
the deduction (have his issue of fact decided by the jury), the burden of
going forward with the evidence does not shift to his adversary.4 The latter's
failure to come forward with evidence to rebut the basic facts or the fact to be
inferred simply may subject him to an adverse verdict by the jury.5 Professor
Wiginore concludes: "So long as the law attaches no legal consequences
upon the opponent to come forward with contrary evidence, there is no
propriety in applying the term 'presumption' to such facts, however great
their probative significance . . ."
rhe collision of one vehicle with another which is stationary (parked
on the side of a highway or stopped in a lane of traffic) has been
1. Cogdell v. Wilnington & W.R.Co., 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E. 618(1903);
9 \VrcMorE, EvIDENcE, § 2552 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Charges on Presumptions
and Burden of Proof, 5 NC.L. REv. 291 (1927); XleBaine, Presumptions: Are They
Evidence, 26 CALIF, L. REV. 519(1938).
2. Cogdell v. Wilmington & W.R.Co., supra note 1.
3. Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Serv. Cu., 136 Oreg. 1, 297 Pac. 1050 (1930).
4. This burden, depending upon the evidence introduced by both parties, may
often shift during the course of trial; on the other hand, the more familiar "burden
of proof" which refers to the risk of non-pursuasion upon all the evidence in a case,
once fixed by the pleadings, never shifts. Behnke v. President & Board of Trustees
of the Village of Brookfield, 366 11. 516. 9 N.E.2d 232(1937); Spilenc v. Salmon
Falls Mfg. Co., 79 NJI 326, 108 Atl. 808(1920).
5. McCormick, Charges on Presumrptions and Burden of Proof, supra note I.
6. 9 WIGNORE, EVIDENCE, § 2490(3d ed. 1940).
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characterized by some courts as a situation iii which the facts shown by
the plantiff's evidence create a "prcsumption of negligence"' on the part
of the driver of the vchicle in the rear. Generally, however, they do so
without mention of the consequent risk to which the defendant would
sulject himself by remaining silent. These courts do not state whether
a true presumption has arisen (wherein the defendant's silence results in
a directed verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of his negligence) or
whether the "presumption" is in actuality but an inference, permitting
the jury to find negligence.8
The unexplained rear-end collision, because the type of accident is
such ". . . that when due care is taken, . . . no injury ordinarily results,"
has been viewed by a significant nunlbcr of jurisdictions as appropriate for
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,10 permitting the plantifl
to establish the defendant's negligence by circumstantial evidence.'' In
Merry v. Knudsen Creamery Co.,'- where defendant's truck had collided
with the rear end of plaintiff's car stopped at a traffic light, the court held
that the doctrine applied and that "the jury would have been warranted
in drawing the inference of negligence front the unexplained failure of
the [dcfendant's] brakes .. ."3 Apart from those jurisdictions which
exprcssly reject the doctrine,' 4 the almost universal rule among the courts
is that res ipsa loquitur, per se, pennits only the inference of negligence
and that a failure on the part of the defendant to assume the burden of
going forward with the evidence requires the submission of the question of
negligence to the jury.' While a few courts adhering to the majority
7. Bauhofer v. Crawford, 16 Cal. App. 676, 117 Pac. 931(1911); lacino v.
Brown, 121 Col. 450, 217 P.2d 266(1950);. Nielsen v. Pyles, 332 II. App. 574,
54 N.E.2d 753(1944); Crochet v. A. & P. Truck Lines, 52 So.2d 265(La. App. 1951);
O'Donnell v. United Electric Rys. Co., 48 R.I. 18, 134 Atl. 642(1926).
8. J. Samuels & Bro. v. Rhode Island Co., 40 R.I. 232, 100 Ati. 402(1917).
9. Pearlman v. V. 0. King Lumber Co., 302 11. App. 190, 23 N.E.2d
826(1939).
10. Cooper v. Agee, 22 Ala. 334, 132 So. 173(1931); Pickwick Stages Corp. v.
Messinger, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168(1934); Merry v. Knudsen Creamery Co., 94
Cal. App. 715, 211 P.2d 905(1949); lacino v. Brown, 121 Col. 450, 217 P.2d
266(1950); Nielsen v. Pyles, 332 I1l. App. 574, 54 N.E.2d 753(1944): Harvey v.
Borg, 218 Iowa 1228, 257 N.W. 190(1934); Crochet v. A. & P. Truck Lines, 52
So.2d 265(La. App. 1951); Bryne v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass.
130, 168 N.E. 540(1929); Whitwell v. Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149 N.W. 299(1914);
tlarke v. Haase, 335 No. 1104, 75 S.W.2d 1001(1934); Manker v. Shaffer, 161 Ohio
St. 285, 118 N.E.2d 641(1954); McCloud v. City of La Follette, 276 S.W.2d 763
(Tenn. App. 1954).
11. PRossER, I'ouTs, § 43, p. 211(2d cd. 1955).
12. 94 Cal. App. 715, 211 P.2d 905(1949).
13. Id. at 905.
14. Rebentisch v. Korda, 331 Mich. 37, 49 N.V.2d 192(1951); Polikoff v.
Shelton, 193 S.C. 398, 8 S.E.2d 494(1940).
15. U.S.: Swcency v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233(1913); Ala.- Cooper v. Agece, 22
Ala. 334, 132 So. 173(1931); Cal.: Merry v. Knudsen Creamery Co., 94 Cal. App.
715, 211 P.2d 905(1949); Conn.: Levine v. Union and New Haven Trust Co., 127
Conn. 435, 17 A.2d 500(1941); D.C.: Pistorio v. Washington R. & Electric Co.,
46 App. D.C. 479(1917); Fla.: Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946);
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view have held, in highly unusual situations wholly unrelated to automobile
accidents, that the plantiff was entitled to a directed verdict when
the defendant remained silent,'" it is apparent that the rear-end collision
is within the general rule, 7 as creating only an inference of negligence.
Similar effect has been afforded by several courts which hold that an
inference of negligence arises, without invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur 8 \While these decisions arc in fact repugnant to any concept
of presumption, they arc surpassed by the even more conservative view
espoused by a minority of courts," namely that res ipsa loquitur cannot
apply because the mere facts of collision and consequent injury cannot
warrant the conclusion that the type of occurrence is one which "in the
ordinary experience of mankind would not have happened except for
the negligence of the defcndant.'"'2 rl'he plaintiff, under this view, is not
only denied the benefit of favorable instructions to the jury but may
himself suffer a directed vcrdict,'-
In the instant case, one of first impression in Florida, the Second
District Court of Appeal noted that in three jurisdictions 22 a presumption
of negligence arises on the showing of a rear-end collision in contrast
to the view of other courts -'; that a mere inference arises. Adopting the
American Dist. Electric Productive Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co,, 129 Fla. 518, 177
So. 294(1937); Ga,: Bowers v. Fred W. Amend Co,, 35 S.E.2d 15(Ga. App. 1945);
Ill.: Chestnut v. Lotisville & N. R. Co., 335 Ill. App. 254, 81 N.E.2d 660(1948);
Iowa; Anderson V. Fort I)odge. 1. M. & S. R. Co., 208 Iowa 369, 226 N.V. 151
(1929); Me.: \Vinslogv v. Tibbctts, 131 Me. 318, 162 AtI. 785(1932); Mass.:
Liberatore v. Framingham, 315 Mass. 538, 53 N.E.2d 561(1944); Minn.: Klingman
v. Loew's Inc., 209 Minn. 449, 296 NV. 528(1941); Mo.: Brown-Scott v. Davis,
216 Mo. App. 530, 270 SV. 433(1925); N.J.: Wildauer \. Rudnevitz, 119 N.J.L.
471, 197 Ati. 252(1938); N.Y.: Foltis v. New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E. 2d 455,
153 A.L.R. 1122(1941); N.C.: White v. Hines, 182 NC. 275, 109 S.E. 31(1921);
Ohio: Walker v. Toledo Hotel Co., .59 Ohio App. 229. 17 N.E.2d 422(1938);
S.D.: Mid West Oil Co, v. Aberdeen, 69 S.I). 343, 10 N.W.2d 701(1943); Ten.:
Poor Sisters of St. Francis v, Long, 190 Tenn. 434, 230 S.W.2d 659(1950); Tex.:
Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, 125 Tcx. 288, 81 S.V.2d 659(1935); Utah:
Zoecolillo v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 Pac. 201(1918); Wis.: Rost
v. Roberts, 180 Wis. 207, 192 NA.. 38(1923).
16. Magoffin v. Missouri Pac. R,.R, 102 Mo. 540, 14 SAV. 76(1890) (unex-
plained two train collision); l alterman v. Ilansard, 4 ()hio App. 268, 22 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 443(1915) (plaster falling from hotel ceiling, no explanation by defendant).
17. See PRossER, ToRTs, § 42, p. 206(2d ed. 1955); 5A AM. PJR. Automobiles
§ 928(1956).
18. Wright v. Clausen, 253 Ky. 498, 69 SAV.2d 1062(1934); Mcek v. Allen,
162 Pa. Super. 495, 58 A.2d 370(1948); Eickoff v. Beard-Lany. 199 S.C. 500, 20
S.E.2d 153(1942).
19. Penny v. Golf Refining Co., 217 Ark. 805, 233 S.\V.2d 372(1950). Collis v.
Ashc, 212 Ca. 746, 95 S+E.2d 654(1956); Dimnick v, Follis, 123 Ind. App. 701,
Ill N.I.2d 486(1953); Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 112 A.2d 475(1955);
'rhomason v. Uher, 274 S.W.,2d 103(Tex Civ. App, 1954).
20. Diamnick v. Follis, supra note 19.
21. Brehn v. Lorenz, %ipra note 19.
22. Nielsen v. Pyles, 332 Ill. App. 574. 54 N.E.2d 753(1944); Crochet v. A. &
P. Truck Lines. 52 So.2d 265(La. App. 1951); Nlnhleisen v. Eberhardt, 21 So.2d 235
(La, App. 1945); Douglas v. Silvia, 55 R.I. 260, 180 Atd. 159(1935).
23. Harvey v. Borg, 218 Iowa 1228, 2;7 N.V. 190(1934); Wright v. Clausen.
253 Ky. 498, 69 S,\V.2d 1062, (1934); Meek v, Allen, 162 Pa. Super. 495, 58 A.2d
370(1948).
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former position, the court, relying on an earlier Florida dictum'-' 4 to the
effect that negligence becomes a question of law when the plaintiff's
evidence is undisputed, concluded:2-.
the court could take judicial notice of the fact that it was the
duty of both . . . to stop . . . when a traffic light was . . . red.
In this day of heavy motor traffic all over the nation, the youngest
or the most careless motorist knows that it is negligence to go
through a red light . . . If the defendant had a justifiable reason
for not observing traffic rules, then it was his duty to show that
he was not negligent and thus, permit the case to go to a jury ....
The court's cursory analysis of the authorities cited in support of the
presumption approach indicates precisely the type of problem that may
result when too great reliance is placed on the use of the word "presump-
tion." Thei decisions cited hardly support the proposition announced in
that they: (I ) did not deal directly or even by implication with the
problem before this court;26 (2) were all cases in which the issue of negligence
had been determined by a jury, 2 by a trial judge sitting as the trier of the
facts,2 8 or had been precluded by a dismissal of the plaintiff's causc;2 9 and
(3) clearly indicated, regardless of the use of the term "presumption"
that res ipsa loquitur applied with all its procedural consequences previously
discussed. Since the court placed particular emphasis on the Rhode Island
approach, it is worthwhile to examine the source of the "rule" that proof
of a rear-end collision makes a prima facie case of negligence-a presumption
according to the court. O'Donnell v. United Electric Rys. Co.1° held that
it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant
where the circumstances of the collision were disputed. The court, however,
went further approving its earlier decisioiP, which had held that even
where the collision was undisputed the question of negligence still had to
be submitted to the jury. The "rule," therefore, of this jurisdiction, like
that of the other decisions cited by the Florida court, would seem to
up hold the proposition that only an inference of negligence can arise.
\Vhile the court's decision in the iustant case epitomizes the procedural
consequences that distinguish the true presumption from an inference, its
position cannot be reconciled with that of all other jurisdictions which
have dealt with the problem. A more recent decision 2 of the Third
District Court of Appeal has adopted Cusack v. McNulty as the applicable
rule, perpetuating a tenuous position.
24. Townsend Sash Door & Lumber Co, v. Silas, 82 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 1955).
25. McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785, 788(Fla. App. 1958).
26. See note 8, supra.
27. Nielsen v. Pyles, 332 II. App. 574, 54 N.E.2d 753(1944); Douglas v. Silvia,
55 R.I. 260, 180 AtI. 359(1935).
28. Muhleisen v. Eberhardt, 21 So.2d 235(La. App. 1945).
29. Crochet v. A. & P. Truck Lines, 52 So.2d 265(.a. App. 1951).
30. 48 R.I. 18, 134 Ati. 642(1926).
31. J. Samnuels & Bro. v. Rhode Island Co., 40 R.I. 232, 100 Atl. 402(1917).
32. Shedden v. Yellow Cab Co,, 105 So.2d 388(Fla. App. 1958).
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The courts should be reluctant to formulate crystalizecd, rigid rules of
law for an occurrence subjcct to such infinite variation in its facts as an
automobile collision. Its very nature demands that reason weigh and con-
sider all attendmt circumstances before any conclusion can be rationally
drawn as to their effect upon liability. "No two collisions are exactly alike,
and ... particularly in a rear-end collision, issues of fact are raised, which
should he submitted to the jury . .."' (Emphasis added) This underlies,
in part, the rationale of the prevailing view that permits the inference
of negligence. Moreover, this approach tacitly recognizc6 that in this
situation, negligence can only be established by circumstantial evidence,
collision and injury being tic "facts" from which reasonable men can
infer the ultimate fact, negligice. "Negligence is never presumed; it, or
the circumstantial basis for the inference of it, must be established by
competent proof, and whether it exists is pre-eminently a question . . . for
the jury."3 4 It should remain such.
SAMUEL L. HELLER
CONFLICT OF LAWS--NON-JUDICIAL DIVORCES
Thc petitioner, a non-immigrant alicn student, temporarily in the
United States, was grantcd a non-judicial divorce from his wife living
in Pakistan, by an Islamic religious official in New York. Although this
procecdling was apparently valid in thc domiciliary country of Pakistan,
New York Law required a "duc judicial proceeding" in order to secure
a divorce. Tlhe petitioner brought an action to review an order denying
his application for a change in status to that of a permanent resident
alici, by reason of his marriage to an American citizen. Held, the marriage
was void because of the invalidity of the prior divorce. Shikoh v. Murff,
257 17.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958).
A widely held view is that non-judicial divorces ' must be authorized
by the law of the state wherein they took place; this rule prevails even
in situations where such divorces have been obtained in compliance with
the law of the nationality or domicile of the parties which generally
governs thcir personal status.- rI1he reason for this view is based on primary
33. O'Donnell v. United Electric lRys. Co., 48 R.I. 18, 134 Atd. 642(1926),
34. Murphy v. Terzako, 14 N.J. Super. 2S4, 82 A.2d 1(1951).
I. '1l'e casenote will concern itself with a comparative study of the English and
American positions on recognition of noujudicial divorces occurring within their
territorial jurisdiction, but valid acording to the law of the foreign domicile of the
iudividual parties.
2. 1 RAIIEL, 'H: CONFL.TC'r OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE S'riUrs 485 (1947);
3 ARMINJOt, PRECS DE DROIT iN'ERNATIONAL PRIVI" 34, 35 (1931); WOLFF, INTErR-
NAT1ONAi.ES PRIVATREIIT 132 (1933); NUSSBAUM, DEiTSCI ES INTERNATIONALES
IRIVATRECEIT IJNTI.R RESONDEN ]BER(JCKSICTIlc, NG DES OSTIERREICJISCFIEN UND SCllWEIZE-
[VOL. XIII
